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INTRODUCTION 
It only takes a moment's glance at the footers of the Stationery Office edition of the 
Civil Procedure Rules 1998, each giving the date of its last amendments, to see that 
Part 36, governing payments into court by defendants and the equivalent claimants' 
offers,1 has been amended at least as much as any other rule. An idle comparison 
between the existing rule and practice direction, newly amended in February 2001, and 
the original draft in the famous "brown book" appended to Lord Woolf s final report 
demonstrates a process of shaping and reshaping of the rule that is, in this writer's 
opinion, yet to be completed. Practitioners will recall the initial uncertainty over 
CPR r. 36.20 which in its initial version, omitting the word "defendant's" from 
r. 36.20(l)(b), suggested that a claimant could be penalised for a failure to beat his or 
her own offer. 
It is, of course the penalties2 that render discussion of Part 36 of such immediate 
relevance to practitioners. There are penalties on both sides: the obvious penalties 
against the recipient of a payment or offer denned in rr. 36.20 and 36.21; and the less 
transparent penalty potentially suffered by a party making a payment or offer: that of 
having it accepted with such alacrity that it becomes clear the payment or offer was too 
generous. The parties are, in effect, penalised for a failure to come to an agreement or 
for coming to an agreement that unduly benefits one party. The latter is - as in the 
general law of contract - a matter of normal business hazard. It is the fact that the 
basis of CPR Part 36 is a sanction for a failure to come to an agreement that takes 
' CPR Part 36 adds to the pre-existing defendant's payment into court (now CPR r. 36.3) the further possibilities of a 
defendant's offer in relation to non-money issues such as apportionment of liability (in effect regulating the common-law 
Calderbank offer, see for example C P R r. 36.5(4)) and offers to settle by claimants (for money or otherwise). If a claimant's 
offer is not accepted but is not "beaten" at trial by the defendant - for example, because the offer was to settle for £80,000 
and the final award of damages was £100,000 - the defendant will be ordered to pay in addition to the damages awarded, 
interest of 10% above base rate from the date the offer could have been accepted, indemnity costs for the same period, 
and interest on those costs again at 10% above base rate: CPR r. 36.21. For an application of this sanction, see Little 
and others v. George Little Sebire & Co., The Times, 17th November 1999. 
2
 A common but in principle inaccurate description, a judicial preference having been expressed for regarding the costs 
and/or additional interest as no more than one amongst an armoury of sanctions available to ensure compliance with 
the rules now governing civil litigation in England and Wales: see All-in-One Design and Build Ltd v. Motcomb Estates 
Ltd and another (2000) 144 S.J.L.B. 219. One must, however, make a significant distinction between this and other 
sanctions; - here the party is being sanctioned for a failure to give up his or her case, a failure to forfeit the day in court. 
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it beyond the normal law of contract. It is, however, the interface between the law of 
contract and the special provisions of CPR Part 36 that informed the discussion of the 
Court of Appeal in Scammell v. Dicker. 
T H E FACTS 
The facts relevant to this discussion are simple. The defendant made a Part 36 offer in 
a claim related to the grant of a declaration - and it is significant here to distinguish 
a Part 36 offer by a defendant from a Part 36 payment by a defendant in a money 
claim3 - less than 21 days before trial but otherwise apparently in proper format. 
Proper format in the circumstances requires the offer, inter alia, to "be expressed to 
remain open for acceptance for 21 days from the date it is made".4 In fact, and because 
of the proximity of the trial, the offer could not in any event be accepted without either 
agreement between the parties as to costs or the permission of the court.5 Five days 
later the defendant withdrew her offer. The claimants then purported to accept the 
offer, to reach agreement as to costs and sought to adjourn the trial. At first instance 
it was considered that to allow the offer to be withdrawn flouted the spirit of the CPR. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed. 
PREVIOUS A U T H O R I T Y AS TO W I T H D R A W A L 
Given, as has been previously explained, the natural desire of the profession to 
concentrate on the sanctions and the circumstances in which they will be applied or 
disapplied, it is not surprising that the majority of the existing case law concentrates 
in that area.6 The existing case law as to withdrawal of the offer appeared to consist 
of a single decision in the Technology and Construction Court: Pitchmastic pic v. Birse 
Construction Ltd (No. 2).1 Here, after the trial, but presumably prior to judgment, the 
claimants purported to accept a defendant's offer that they had rejected before the trial. 
Dyson J. held that the ordinary rules of offer and acceptance applied to define whether 
or not a contract of compromise had been achieved.8 The offer had expired on its 
rejection9 and, unlike a Part 36 payment,10 no permission was required to withdraw it. 
This distinction between the Part 36 payment and the Part 36 offer was reinforced by 
the Court of Appeal in Scammell v. Dicker on the following grounds: 
3
 See note 1, supra. 
4
 C P R r. 36.5(6)(a). 
5
 CPR r.36.5(6)(b) and r 36.1! (2). 
6
 Little and others v. George Little Sebire & Co.,note 1, supra; Ford v. GKR Construction Ltd and others [2000] 1 W.L.R. 
1397; Jones v. Jones, The Times, l l l h November 1999; All-in-One Design, note 2, supra; Petrotrade Inc. v. Texaco Ltd, 
The Times, 14th June 2000; Amber v. Stacey [2001] C.P. Rep. 26; Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd v. Thomson Holidays Ltd, 
2001, Lawtel Doc. C0100729, Ch. D.; Clark Goldring & Page Lid v. ANC Ltd, The Times, 27th March 2001. 
7
 The Times, 21st June 2000. 
8
 There is insufficient scope in this casenote to discuss whether the doctrine of forbearance to sue is adequate to provide 
consideration in every case in which the use of Part 36 results in a settlement. In many ways it is attractive to consider 
the offer to be unilateral, provision of the appropriate notice of acceptance being itself the consideration. The decision 
in Scammell v. Dicker, however, that a Part 36 offer can be withdrawn at will causes some theoretical difficulty with a 
"unilateral contract" analysis. In terms of the latter, once performance has begun - for example the notice of acceptance 
has been posted but is yet to arrive (the "postal acceptance rule" being ousted by C P R r. 36.8(5)) - it may no longer 
be possible to withdraw the offer: see Errington v. Errington [1952] 1 K..B. 290 and the accumulating comment thereon. 
9
 The logical corollary, apparently accepted in this case, is that a Part 36 payment ceases to be effective on rejection even 
though the intervention of the court is required before it can be withdrawn (CPR r. 36.6(5). 
10
 CPR r. 36.6(5). 
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a) Part 36 does not state that an offer cannot be withdrawn;11 
b) An offer made not less than 21 days before trial need only be initially 
"expressed" to remain open for 21 days.12 There was no requirement that it 
remain open that long and there was no similar requirement for an ostensible 
validity period for the offer where it was made closer than 21 days to trial;13 
c) Nor was it contemplated by the rules that the offeror would be prevented from 
withdrawing the offer until a "reasonable period" had expired;14 
d) CPR r. 36.5(8) only set out the effect of withdrawal but placed no time limit 
on withdrawal. If the offer could not be withdrawn, that could cause hardship in 
which case one might expect a similar provision to that governing Part 36 
payments in CPR r. 36.6(5) requiring the court's permission to be obtained. 
The Part 36 offer was, ultimately, defined as an offer to enter into a contract and it 
is axiomatic that an offer to enter into a contract can be withdrawn.15 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, if it is a contractual offer, a Part 36 offer or payment is an unusual species of 
offer. Its format is prescribed, as are many of its terms. In one of its manifestations -
the Part 36 payment - withdrawal of the offer is subject to the permission of the 
court.16 If its acceptance creates a contract, is the consideration forbearance to sue or 
is it a unilateral offer?17 It is an offer, which, if not positively withdrawn or rejected, 
the offeror can be held to after its ostensible 21-day validity has expired.18 It is an offer, 
the failure to accept which can be sanctioned. The reason, it is submitted, that the 
ordinary law of contract has to be used to define the effect of withdrawal of a Part 36 
offer is simply that, as recognised in Scammell v. Dicker, neither Part 36 nor Practice 
" Indeed, the only reference to withdrawal of an offer is in C P R r. 36.5(8) - "If a Part 36 offer is withdrawn it will not 
have the consequences set out in this part". 
12
 CPR r. 36.5(6). 
13
 CPR r. 36.5(7). 
14
 Indeed, the contrary has applied where - entirely within the contemplation of the rules, the offer is accepted late: see for 
example, R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others (No. 6), The Times, 10lh January 
2001. 
15
 Byrne & Co v. Van Tienhoven (1880) 5 C.P.D. 344. Clearly, however, additional consideration can be given, creating a 
contract to keep the offer open for a prescribed period. Simple logistics will normally prevent difficulty in the case of a 
Part 36 payment where the money is under the supervision of the court and will be paid to the acceptor by the court. 
Where there is a Part 36 offer, and specifically a claimant's Part 36 offer to accept a sum of money in settlement of a 
claim, then what is the effect of a failure to pay? CPR r. 36.15 (5) would seem to suggest that, for enforcement purposes, 
it is not necessary to regard the acceptance as creating a contract as the court has specific power to enforce the agreement. 
However, if acceptance of the offer creates a contract, that contract will be enforceable outside the ambit of Part 36. It 
is suggested that this is particularly necessary in the one circumstance where the separate jurisdiction to enforce does not 
apparently apply; namely where both offer and acceptance take place prior to issue of proceedings under CPR r. 36.10. 
In early drafts of Part 36 the pre-issue offer was made explicitly analogous to the post-issue offer. This has not survived 
into the operational rules. It is in this case, that presumably the parties will have to rely on the doctrine that forbearance 
to sue can amount to consideration: see Halsbury's Laws of England Vol: Contract at para. 740. 
16
 Of course leave was always necessary to withdraw a payment into court (RSC Ord. 22 r. 1(3)), essentially, it can be 
inferred, on logistical grounds. The existence of the Part 36 offer and the decision that a Part 36 offer can be withdrawn 
at will creates a discrepancy between the various forms of offer available under CPR Part 36 (in view of the differing 
penalties on claimants and defendants imposed by C P R rr. 36.20 and 36.21, one might indeed say, a further discrepancy, 
except that here a defendant's Part 36 offer in a non-money claim will have the same effect as a claimant's Part 36 offer 
in any claim). Pre-CPR case law suggested that there had to be good reason before a payment into court could be 
withdrawn (Cumper v. Pothecary [1941] 2 A l l E.R. 516). Current policy will define whether or not a payment can be 
withdrawn by the principles of CPR Part 1: the overriding objective: Marsh v. Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust, The 
Times, 13th March 2001. 
17
 See note 8, supra. 
18
 See CPR r. 36.11(2)(b) and r. 36.12 (2)(b). 
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Direction 36 regulate how such an offer can be withdrawn. Normally, of course, the 
litigation will be in the hands of solicitors and any withdrawal will be by letter. But 
for as long as the ordinary law of contract applies to the withdrawal; that withdrawal 
can be oral, or even notified to the offeree informally by someone other than the 
offeror.19 If the principle of CPR r. 1.4(f) is to be followed, it is acceptance, rather than 
withdrawal, that should be encouraged. A simple but clear mechanism regulating 
withdrawal of offers should, it is suggested, be added to CPR Part 36 for the benefit 
of all. 
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 Dickinson v. Dodds (1876) 2 Ch. D. 463. 
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